Some thoughts on Orthodox/Protestant dialogue.

GrahamI was sent an article written by the late Fr Seraphim Rose on “The Proper View of Non-Orthodox Christians” and I would like to share some thoughts on its argument.

While I do not disagree with the general intent and purpose of the article (how to cultivate φιλανθρωπία, or the love of neighbor), I do believe that the article is not as effective as it could be because it does not take into account the many nuances and complexities of Orthodox/Protestant dialogue in the 21st century.

Maybe that is because Fr Seraphim wrote during a time when globalization and the Protestant awareness of Orthodoxy in America had not grown to the extent it has today. Be that as it may, I’d like to address some of the article’s arguments. (Please note that I am addressing only the content of the argument, not making any appraisal of Fr Seraphim, his writings, or anything like that).

The article is available in many places online, e.g., here.

After making some general remarks about how Orthodoxy is the Church, the article starts by saying that

It is not for us to define the state of those who are outside the Orthodox Church.

I think Fr Seraphim begins by unintentionally committing the fallacy of poisoning the well when he asserts that it is not for us to define the state of those who are outside the Church. It assumes that criticisms of error and debates about the church and doctrine, at least in the majority of times, consist of people judging the personal state of those with whom they were interacting; but that is not always the case. Plus, this is not the topic of the article to begin with.

It goes on to say,

About those Christians who are outside the Orthodox Church, therefore, I would say: they do not yet have the full truth. Perhaps it just hasn’t been revealed to them yet, or perhaps it is our fault for not living and teaching the Orthodox Faith in a way they can understand.

Here, I believe Fr Seraphim equivocates on the concept of “the truth not being revealed to them yet.” Of the several possible meanings of this idea, which one is intended here? One could think that he means that people never heard in their entire life about the Orthodox Church and of Christian doctrine, and if so I think this could be a valid point.

However, most interactions in a place like the United States today are not of the sort. On the contrary, they are interactions between Orthodox people and Protestants who know what the Orthodox Church is and what it teaches; and they often are very happy to deny her teachings, in its most central dogmas, and explicitly call Orthodox people non-Christians. So they know. And they reject it.

The only other possible meaning of “God has not yet revealed that to them” would be a subjective, Calvinistic idea of God conveying some secret revelation to people in their hearts. I don’t know if Fr Seraphim meant this, but this meaning would be problematic for several reasons: first, because it is not for us to inquire about secret and hidden things; also, because the Church in its history did not simply tell those who opposed Christian truth by saying, “maybe God didn’t reveal it to you.” Well, maybe God didn’t, but truth is truth, and error was rejected. Explicitly. In many councils.

The article also makes some vague statements about using the terms “heresy” and “heretic.” For example,

Among Western converts to Orthodoxy there is indeed a temptation to speak too freely of “heresy” and “heretics,” and to make the errors of the non-Orthodox an excuse for a certain pharisaic smugness about our own Orthodoxy.

Perhaps it is true that people might use those terms too loosely at times. However, the clear, intentional, informed, obstinate, and deliberate denial of the central tenets of Christianity by many Protestants is also a reality.

It is a common experience of many practicing Orthodox people in a place like United States, who have friends and relatives who are Protestants, to be told explicitly things like, “there is no such thing as the Eucharist, there is no such thing as the bread and wine becoming the Body and Blood of Christ. This is idolatry and paganism. Communion is just a memorial, it’s just bread and wine, or better, crackers and grape juice.”

Or, “the Virgin and Theotokos is neither a virgin nor the mother of God. This is idolatry and paganism; she is only the mother of Jesus, she was just a pipe through which God sent the physical body of his Son.”

Or, “The Orthodox Church is not the Church; it is not in the Body of Christ. It is at best just another denomination, at worst a pagan group developed after Constantine, and people in it deny Christ and go to hell.”

Or “asking for the help and prayers of the ‘saints’ is idolatry, necromancy, paganism, it is empowered  by demons, and it is a sure sign that one is going to hell.”

I could go on with many other examples. These I report from personal interactions and listening to Protestant public teaching, from the pulpit, media, etc.

Maybe one is prepared to be confronted with such things and shrug if off in the name of love. After all, there is some truth in Protestantism (as it is inevitable – there is much truth in Buddhism and Islam as well), and, as Fr Seraphim says,

Almost all of the [Protestant] religious Christmas carols are all right, and they are sung by Orthodox Christians in America (some of them even in the strictest monasteries!).

Maybe Fr Seraphim was thinking of some of the classic Protestant hymns of John Newton and the Wesleys, not the, shall we say, interesting things sung in modern pop evangelical Jesus-is-my-boyfriend Christian rock.

Be that as it may, I don’t think that true love, in this situation, is one not to address truth. This would be simply superficial indifference and compromise. And I don’t think the Fathers of the Ecumenical Councils who gave their lives to defend truth and evangelize the world would agree with that approach either.

yelling1Many Protestants say these things outlined above to Orthodox people. They deny the Eucharist, the Church, the Mother of God, the communion of saints, the Mysteries (Sacraments), and Orthodox Christology. They actively teach the erroneous alternatives to the Christian Faith.

They also say these things to other Protestants. Pastors and teachers say these things from the pulpit. Protestant churches use all available media tools to spread these errors and to keep people from being joined to the Body of Christ. I have heard, read, or been told these things hundreds of times.

The article ends by affirming that we should view or non-Orthodox people as potentially Orthodox, and live peaceably with them and not be harsh towards them.

In the end, we should view the non-Orthodox as people to whom Orthodoxy has not yet been revealed, as people who are potentially Orthodox (if only we ourselves would give them a better example!). There is no reason why we cannot call them Christians and be on good terms with them, recognizing that at least we have our faith in Christ in common, and live in peace especially with our own families. A harsh, polemical attitude is called for only when the non-Orthodox are trying to take away our flocks or change our teaching.

I think this is a very problematic equivocation, and here’s why.

It assumes that opposing these errors I listed here, and many others, is automatically, and by definition, equivalent to being harsh, to considering people as lost causes, enemies, or wanting not to be peaceable with them.

Not only this is not true, very often the opposite is true. We speak the truth in love with the hope that people will embrace the truth and reject error, not because we don’t consider them as potentially living in the Truth.

We live in a society where truth has been, by and large, demoted from the public square and reduced to personal, subjective preferences. The  popular idea that “truth is relative” is something that many people actually believe. And one offspring of such darkness is the increase in hatred against opposing views.

We already see this in the current socio-political condition of this country, where “toleration” is something that one only wishes to apply to his or her opinion, but never to extend to the ones who disagree with him or her. More than ever, people do not accept opposing views, and express hatred against those who hold them. We are living in an increasingly fascist society when it comes to ideas and freedom of speech. It probably won’t be too long before people can be jailed for simply saying particular Christian beliefs out loud which are out of step with current popular opinion.

This carries on to the religious arena as well. Ironically, very often, the same evangelical Christians who complain about not having the liberty to believe as they will in the secular world, will not tolerate being questioned in their beliefs by other Christians either.

I cannot count how many times I have witnessed Protestants reacting with hatred at the mere mention that their views are in error. Not necessarily by an Orthodox –  it could be a Lutheran questioning Word-of-Faith preachers, or many other combinations.

Protestants are often very eager to affirm the things I outlined above, but if one tries to explain why the affirmations are erroneous, the reaction is something like, “how dare you? Who do you think you are? How dare you judge me? You are rude and judgmental and harsh!”

Image result for yelling womanMost often, it would not matter if you were to oppose their views on your knees and holding out flowers and a box of chocolates. The mere objective mention of their error, or the defense of the Christian faith and truth, is a cause for hatred and the accusation of rudeness, arrogance, and of being judgmental.

It is no surprise that those who have been wounded by the zeitgeist (as we all have some way) get angry when confronted with the truth, even if the “confrontation” is done with respect and even gentleness.

I do not doubt that many people have failed to be gentle and respectful in their theological interactions. I am sure I have at times. We should all heed the call to gentleness and respect.

But I am convinced that more often than not, the problem is just the opposite. It is that people knowingly and deliberately reject the truth they do know, much like the Pharisees of old; they do not like being opposed in any way that does not suit their personal preference. Because for many Christians in America, Christianity, either in itself, or in its different “expressions,” is a matter of preference, not ultimate truth. That is why many Protestants now, more than ever, incessantly pursue the Holy Grail of being “relevant” to the public preferences du jour.

I do not even need to list the numerous passages in the New Testament where St. Paul and others command their co-workers to “rebuke sharply” those who oppose the truth.

I worked for a few years in countercult apologetics when I was a Protestant. I have seen how cults operate. Groups like the Jehovah’s Witnesses, and so on. They might be “potential” Protestants and Christians, but they are not Protestants, and they are not Christians. They’re cults. They jeopardize peoples’ lives spiritually. Maybe God has not yet revealed something to them either.

Often they also react with anger and hatred against those who very gently, objectively, and respectfully speak and publish against their serious errors. Against people who have spent their entire lives, as a calling, reaching out to them and “speaking the truth in love” to help pluck them out of the fire.

Many of those people speaking the truth are former cultists. I have met them. Many of them are very thankful that somebody reached out to them. They are thankful that people were not afraid to be hated or thought of being jerks by simply telling them the truth. They are thankful that people cared and reached out and spoke the truth to them.

Our friends and family members who are Protestants may not be in cults. But, as I mentioned above, they can very clearly, deliberately, and obstinately espouse very serious error and spread such errors against the truth of Christ. They do it here in this country. They also send missionaries to Orthodox countries to “evangelize” them – i.e., get them out of the Church and into their own groups and versions of “Christianity.”

I believe Fr Seraphim’s article, which I have seen circulating on the interwebs, and which is well-intentioned, does a disservice by implying that presenting truth is, automatically and by definition, unkind; and that we should “live in peace” and quiet alongside outspoken error and heresy for the sake of being nice and not being thought of as rude.

On the contrary, we should speak the truth in love.

As I write this, I’m reminded that last night I was invited by a friend to attend the Service at the old ROCOR Cathedral in San Francisco, when in a couple of weeks he (a Protestant convert) will be made an official catechumen so he can be baptized and Chrismated into the Church. Because people who cared (including me) spoke the truth in love and took the time to answer his questions.

Glory to God!

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St Symeon the New Theologian on the Theotokos and the Eucharist

st-symeon-the-new-theologian“The same undefiled flesh which He accepted from the pure loins of Mary, the all-pure Theotokos, and with which He was given birth in the body, He gives to us as food.

And when we eat of it, when we eat worthily of His flesh, each one of use receives within himself the entirety of God made flesh, our Lord Jesus Christ, son of God and son of the immaculate Virgin Mary . . .

He is present in the body bodilessly, mingled with our essence and nature, and deifying us who share His body, who are become flesh of His flesh and bone of His bone . . . This is the mystery all full of holy terror which I hesitate even to write, and tremble in recounting.

Thus, while from His immaculate mother He borrowed her immaculate flesh, and gave her in return His own divinity – o strange and new exchange! – He takes no flesh from the saints, but He does make them sharers of His own deified flesh. . . .

Just as we all receive of His fullness, so do we all partake of the immaculate flesh of His all-holy Mother which He assumed, and so, just as Christ our God, true God, became her son; even so we too – O the ineffable love for mankind! – become sons of His mother, the Theotokos, and brothers of Christ Himself . . .

The Mother of God is lady and Queen and mistress and mother of all the saints. The saints are all both her servants, since she is the mother of God, and her sons, because they partake of the all-pure flesh of her Son . . .

The saints therefore are triply her kin: first in that they are related to her from the same clay and breath of life given Adam;

Secondly, that they have communion and share with her in the flesh which was taken from her;

Thirdly and last, that on account of the hallowing which has come to pass in them through her by virtue of the Spirit, each conceives in like manner to her within himself the God of all, as she bore Him in herself.

For, if indeed she gave birth to him in the body, yet she always possessed all of Him in the Spirit, and has Him now, and will ever have Him inseparable from her.

So this is the mystery of the marriages which the Father arranged for His only-begotten Son, Who with Him is co-everlasting and of equal dignity. And He invited many, and sent his servants to invite those who were called to the weddings, and they would not come.”

St Symeon the New Theologian, c. 1010 AD
First Ethical Discourse

Faith and Reason, Theology and Philosophy – what do we know and how?

Faith and ReasonFor Aquinas, philosophy considers the nature of things as they are in themselves, whereas theology considers things as they are in relation to God.

The distinction, first, involves the point of view. From the point of view of theology, there are things that can be known by reason alone, and some of those things have been revealed by God, but they might not have been. These are things revealable.

They are encompassed by theology when they are investigated and understood in their relation to God as their source and their end. In addition, theology also involves those things that can be known only by revelation. For example, that God is a Trinity. These are the revelatum.

In this way, all things can be considered within the scope of theology because they are treated sub ratione Dei, under the logic of God, within the context of God being their source and end, and of the ordering of all things within a hierarchical structure of all reality towards God. For Aquinas, theology is a science of revelation, acquired from the Word of God. This is his idea of sacra doctrina  – the sacred doctrine of God and of the beatorum.

From the point of view of philosophy, things that can be known apart from revelation can be extracted from their theological context and be viewed as they are in themselves, judged from the point of view of natural reason. In this way, not only the physical sciences, but also metaphysical knowledge, can be investigated in its own right, as well as be inserted in a theological structure without losing its strictly philosophical nature.

There is a science of reason that can be integrated with the science of revelation without compromising the structure of either (although, when integrated, the science of reason is subordinated to and ordered according to the science of revelation). Philosophy investigates creatures as they are in themselves, and theology investigates all things as they are in relation to God.

In this way, there are things that are accessible to human understanding and reason; for example, mathematics, physical sciences, metaphysical inquiry in which the existence of a simple Being whose essence is identical with its existence is the Prime Mover of all creation, etc.

These things are in principle knowable by human reason unaided by revelation, even though some of them have been revealed. They are the revealable, the revelabilia.

This human learning, then can be incorporated into theology. Some of these things have been given through revelation: for example, a metaphysician can, by reason alone, demonstrate the existence of God. But since not all men are metaphysicians – they do not have the training, the aptitude, the time, etc. – God has revealed that in order that all men might be saved.

There are also things that can be known only by revelation. This is the realm of the revelatum. Examples are the Trinity, the Incarnation, sin, etc. They are not accessible to human reason save by revelation; this is not to say they conflict with human reason, quite the contrary. But it is to say that human reason alone can neither attain, deduce, or prove those things.

AquinasTheology therefore depends solely on what is revealed by sacred scripture, and order all things – even things that are known by human reason alone, some of which have been revealed and some of which have not – sub ratione Dei.

Theology contains both what has been revealed by God and our rational understanding of that revelation. Theology receives what has been revealed and then spreads itself to consider all things under that point of view, ordered from God and to God. The things necessary for salvation are the articles of faith, which God has revealed.

Other things, which can be incorporated into theology, are not necessary for salvation, but they make the understanding of things necessary for salvation more explicit.

For Aquinas, then, sacred science can consider all things – all branches of philosophy –  from one point of view, insofar as they are revealable, and ordered according to God as their source and end. Faith and reason can be viewed as two intersecting circles, because there are things that are included in both at the same time (things knowable by reason alone which have also been revealed). The circles also have their content which do not intersect – e.g., the Trinity belongs to the realm of theology and faith and it is not attainable or proven by reason (these are things necessary for salvation), and there are also things known by reason alone that God has not revealed, even if he could have.

Reason and faith therefore are neither put in opposition, or in isolation, or in identity.Each has its proper realm according to the point of view of how they are considered.

Theology, however, is the higher science because it can encompass everything philosophy can discover, but it also includes things revealed that philosophy cannot discover. Also, when theology consider all revealable things sub ratione Dei, it does so in a way that is in accordance with human reason, because human reason, while limited and unable to attain to the revelatum, is never in conflict with it. Even when faith and reason cover the same territory, they each retain their own characteristics.

For human reason, sensible objects are always the point of departure of all of our knowledge, even as they have retained vestiges of the divine nature as their cause. Reason thus can have a preliminary role of pointing us to investigate the Ultimate Cause. It can also have a didactic purpose of explaining what has been revealed: either in the different ways of apologetics (confuting Christian or pagan error, etc.) as well as developing Christian theology in a coherent and encompassing way, approximating the knowledge of all things to the knowledge God has of himself and the knowledge that the blessed in heaven have.

Reason is used by theology to clarify the truths of faith. But the truths of faith that depend of revelation – the revelatum – cannot be attainable by reason alone or proven by reason alone. The attempt to do so is to confirm the unbeliever in his unbelief.

In this way, Aquinas is neither a rationalist nor a fideist.

He is not a rationalist because he makes very clear that things that are necessary for salvation can only be known through revelation and received by faith. He is not a fideist because he both preserves the legitimate realm of philosophy in which things can be considered as they are in themselves, as well as incorporates it into the realm of theology in which all things are considered from the point of view of revelation, while being understood in accordance with human reason.

Aquinas protects theology from rationalism and creation from contemptio mundi. In this way, grace does not destroy nature but perfects it.

Is the Theotokos “more honorable than the cherubim, more glorious beyond compare than the seraphim”?

A friend, exploring the Faith, particularly in relation to the Theotokos, presented some concerns about her role and work as viewed, expressed, and experienced by the Church. Here is a summary of his concerns:

  1. There is one Mary in Scripture who was a humble woman that was chosen by God to bear Jesus and she accepted God’s will to be the mother of His Son. Then I see a second Mary in the modern church, and there are Bible verses that I see as contradictory to the statement that Mary is more glorious than the Seraphim and more honorable than the Cherubim (e.g. Ps. 8). Humans are “lower than the angels.”
  1. Prophets and Church councils say things, and those are valid if they can agree with the data of Scripture.
  1. There are also practical questions like, how can Mary (or the Saints) hear two people during Paraklesis that are simultaneously praying to her if the two persons are on two opposite sides of the Earth? How can they hear millions of people all over the world at once? God is omniscient and omnipresent, but are Mary and the Saints also omniscient and omnipresent? Maybe there is a way they can hear, but I am not aware of that “valid data”.

Here’s some preliminary responses:

JoyofAllWhoSorrowFirst, I think some good reading in Church history would be helpful. So I will give you a list at the end towards that purpose. The reason is that, in this particular topic, you say that there is a disconnect between the Theotokos in Scripture (and presumably the first few centuries) and the Theotokos of the “modern” church. Nothing can be further from the truth.

The earliest Church Fathers – beginning most clearly with Irenaeus – had a very rich theology of Mary as the Second Eve.

In redemption, the Father sends the second Adam in the power of the Holy Spirit to bring about union again. The divine Logos comes and takes residence in a womb that becomes “more spacious than the heavens.” The Father sends the Son in the Holy Spirit, who sanctifies the new Temple and the new Ark of the covenant in the Theotokos. The Ark now contains the true Manna – the very Flesh and Blood of God, the Bread from Heaven – the true eternal Word, and the true Aaron’s staff that budded.

As the first Eve had received the words of death from the angel of death, turning from the Spirit in disobedience, so now the second Eve receives the words of life from the angel of life (Gabriel) and becomes the dwelling place of the very Word of God, as she submits herself in love and wonder by her fiat to the Holy Spirit who comes upon her.

The tree of the knowledge of good and evil, in the center of the garden (paradiso) became the tree of death, its fruit the fruit of disobedience, disunion and death; and in redemption, the cross, the tree of death in the garden of death (Golgotha) becomes the tree of life, as death is trampled upon and destroyed, because the Fruit of the tree is the Son who offers himself to the Father and to creatures. Paradise is regained.

The Resurrection consummates the deification, the Ascension consummates the objective union in heaven, and at the same time starts the impartation of this work, in the Holy Spirit, at Pentecost.

Eve was the mother of all living who became the mother of all who are dead while living. The Second Eve, who bore the Second Adam (1 Cor 15:45, Rom. 5:14) becomes the mother of all truly living because she is the mother of the Living One, the One Who Is.

As the platyteras of Orthodox temples depict, usually behind the altar, Christ is born in the center of the Theotokos, the God Bearer – which then becomes true for all who are united to him in faith; Christ is “formed in us” objectively through baptism, subjectively through faith, and this is rooted in his objective birth in creation and restoration of union effected in the Holy Spirit. We become God bearers in the Holy Spirit, icons being restored to the image of the Son.

Platytera at St Paul's Greek Orthodox Church in Irvine

Platytera at St Paul’s Greek Orthodox Church in Irvine, CA

The Theotokos is not the main subject of the Gospels. The Incarnation, life, work, death, burial and resurrection of the Son of God is. Therefore, it is expected that one would read of the “maidservant of the Lord” and not about the one who is more glorious than the highest order of angels. Just like it is expected that we don’t read fundamental Christian belief in theologically developed forms (such as the Trinity properly defined, or the hypostatic union) in the Gospels or the epistles.

We begin to learn about definitions of fundamental Christian belief and theology when the Church (1) had the ability to discuss such things, after the cessation of persecution in the 4th century (no earlier) and (2) was challenged to do so because of significant heretical movements.

Not surprisingly, we learn about those things which such movements questioned, but not so much about other fundamental beliefs which were not challenged. For example, which council defined infant baptism? Prayer to the saints? Justification by grace through a living faith which includes the working of love? The Eucharist as the literal Body and Blood of Christ? Etc.

None, of course. Because all those things have always been proclaimed (in the Liturgy, the prayers, the common life of the Church) and practiced, taken from granted from apostolic times; and it crossed the mind of no one to challenge those things until 1,500 years later and only in the West. Similarly, we learn of the controversy related to the “Theotokos” only because the Patriarch of Constantinople (Nestorius) was striking at the heart of Christology, and thus of salvation. Not because honoring her was a new thing.

The problem with applying the model you describe, where the statements of a “prophet” or a “council” are then compared to the “data” (of Scripture) in order to be validated, is that first, of course, there are no singular or independent “prophets” in the Church defining dogma. Second, and most importantly, you seem to be confusing the hierarchy of revelation here. Remember that:

  1. When you use “Scripture” as something against which to compare anything, you are already assuming the ultimate authority of the Church. Simply because there is no “Scripture” apart from what the Church has said is Scripture. In other words, the fact that writings (technically, anonymous) about the life of Jesus were attributed to Matthew, Mark, Luke and John and canonized as the Gospels of Scripture, makes evident that this was done by the authority of the Church in whom indwells the Holy Spirit. The same goes to the fact that the epistle of James, or the Apocalypse, etc. are “Scripture;” and say, the Didache or Clement’s letters, or the Shepherd of Hermas (or other early writings) are not. Councils defined the Bible, not the other way around.
  2. This same authority that writes and canonizes Scripture is the authority that interprets it. Given my years of work in biblical and systematic theology, as well as being proficient in Greek and Hebrew, I can personally attest to the fact that Scripture, in its totality and in each of its parts, can be interpreted in many different (and even contradictory) ways in a plausible, scholarly fashion. For every given passage, 4 scholars can give you 5 plausible interpretations, following the strictest rules of hermeneutics and exegesis. At the end of the day, however, it is the Church (whom Jesus instituted and builds, she who never falls because the gates of hell will never prevail against her) the one who determines what the Scriptures mean, in conjunction with the fuller orbit of the life of the Church – which precede Scripture (the prayers, the liturgies, etc.) and of which Scripture is a part.

Arius, Nestorius, and many others, who knew Scripture by heart, were rebuked and condemned by the Church when they came up with their own interpretations – they could and did use many “verses” to support them, and yet they were in conflict with the whole mind of the Church.

The Councils’ definitions of the Trinity, of the hypostatic union, etc., are not found in verses of Scripture. There is nothing said in Scripture about three co-equal and eternal Persons sharing one Essence. Nothing there about one divine Person uniting two natures “unconfusedly, unchangeably, indivisibly, and inseparably.”

To keep to those two examples, Arius and Nestorius came up with all kinds of verses and passages that plausibly supported the ideas of a lesser god or two separate natures. Their interpretations did not conflict necessarily with the “data,” (as you say).

There are many other examples. It might seem trivial to us that statements like “the Father is greater than I” or the fact that there were things Jesus did not know, only the Father, etc., do not affect in the least Christian definitions of the Trinity or the hypostatic union. But that’s just because we have 1,500 years of explicit conciliar Church doctrine behind us.

And yet the Church, out of all the “data,” affirmed her doctrine based on a scriptural hermeneutic that incorporated the unbroken life and practice of the Church. The Church neither builds her doctrine and proclamation on Scripture alone (but rather, as I said, in the liturgies, prayers and Tradition of which Scripture is a part), nor does she use isolated passages exegeted in purely grammatico-historical methods when she uses Scripture. All comes together in an organic whole.

So, thankfully, it is not up to individual Christians to judge the Church’s doctrines against a Scripture that is already given by the Church; it is not up to individual Christians to judge using an independent, sovereign hermeneutic that puts oneself as the final authority on what the Bible means (and thereby what God says). I have written a short blurb on that a while ago on my blog:

https://luminousdarkcloud.wordpress.com/2012/04/03/some-thoughts-on-fundamentalism/

Once again, to address your example (that angels are higher than human beings), it is precisely the point of Hebrews 2, citing Ps. 8, that Jesus Christ became incarnate and a “little lower than the angels” (in a limited sense) so that he could, through his death, burial and resurrection, bring humanity to the very presence of God, deified, with all enemies under His feet, and thereby under the Church’s feet.

It is a human nature united to a divine Person which is enthroned at the right hand of the Father, not a seraph. It is a human being who is chosen to bear God in herself, not a cherub.

It was to no angel (as again, the author of Hebrews states) that God has ever said “you are my Son, today I have begotten you.” And yet this God deified human nature. In the same way, to no angel, cherub or seraph, has God ever said, my Spirit will come upon you because you are the Chosen One to bear the infinite God in your womb and become God’s Mother.

To no other creature God has given the full measure of the Holy Spirit so that her own soul, flesh and blood are united forever with the eternal, incomprehensible, infinite God. No seraph ever burned brighter than the true Burning Bush that contains the living God and is never consumed. Not all the angels of creation, together, could become more spacious than the heavens to contain God himself as she did.

Further, from the totality of Scripture (see, e.g., Rev. 12) and Tradition, no creature has ever been blessed and honored as the Theotokos. She is not called blessed by all generations merely in the sense of one more blessed person out of myriads. She is the blessed one because she is the chosen one. And she chooses back. She submits and reverses the curse, unties the knot.

She is described as the “woman clothed with the sun, with the moon under her feet, and on her head a crown of twelve stars.” She is indeed Mother and Bride, because she is the Mother of God and the embodiment of the Church.

You objected that to be Mother and Bride at the same time would be a weird confusion of categories; but in fact, this is basic Christian theology. Jesus Christ is our Brother and our Bridegroom. We are his brothers and his Bride. She is his Mother and our Mother – “behold your Mother!”

She is the Mother of the King, and thereby the Queen, the lowly maidservant elevated to the highest heavens, just like lowly fallen human nature has been deified. She is the one lower than the angels who is turned into the very dwelling place of the Most High. She was there at Pentecost, but she did not even have to be.

You also state that, in practice, worship and veneration often become the same thing. I think that is a very bad misunderstanding, if it ever happens; one that has been clearly and exhaustively addressed many centuries ago in the Church. This strikes at the heart of Christian life and worship. If one either mixes the two, or thinks the veneration of the Saints is idolatry, one is not really Orthodox, because then one would reject the life of the Church in the communion of Saints.

PentecostChrist has destroyed death, and those who have died in Him are alive. As universally attested by all Christians since the first century, beginning with the martyrs, those who are recognized by the Church as being Saints with a capital “S” are those who have united themselves to the Trinity in the fullest way in this life (a life of holiness and self-giving love).

They now live to intercede and assist the rest of the Body just as they did in their earthly lives (except that now they are glorified and have no hindrances, fully transfigured and linked to the rest of the Church in the Holy Spirit). We venerate them as holy, as models, as inspiration, as helpers, as intercessors, as loved ones.

They are our Fathers and Mothers. They are not our buddies and fellow beggars. They are not beset by sin anymore, and they are no longer limited by human frailty. They don’t eat, don’t sleep, don’t forget.

We don’t just “like” them and hang out with them. We venerate them. We bow before them, much like the Old Testament people (and modern people in many parts of the world) bow before their fathers, their prophets, their kings. Except that the Saints are much more than those people. We bow and venerate them. That is by no means polytheistic worship. It is Christian love and unity in the Holy Spirit.

And only one of them is the one who has given soul, flesh and blood to God as his Mother – the one before whom the demons tremble and flee.

You said Mary did her work already. Nothing is further from the truth. First, she is not simply “Mary” – she is the Theotokos. The Mother of God. That’s how Christians address her. She is not merely one more of us, for all the reasons I stated above (and these are not merely my own personal views, but an attempt at a summary of what the Church affirms).

Her work is not done, in the same way that the work of the Saints is not done. We join them and they join us on “Mount Zion and to the city of the living God, the heavenly Jerusalem, and to innumerable angels in festal gathering, and to the assembly of the firstborn who are enrolled in heaven, and to God, the judge of all, and to the spirits of the righteous made perfect, and to Jesus, the mediator of a new covenant, and to the sprinkled blood that speaks a better word than the blood of Abel.”

The work of the Church is never done – even in the eschaton it won’t ever be done. The work of help and intercession continues now uninterruptedly, along with the unceasing worship and the continuing process of deification and conformity of finite creatures to the infinite energies of God, which will never end.

And yes, they can hear a virtually infinite number of people at any time, anywhere. Why? Because they do not hear with the physical ear, nor do they process physical sounds in the brain. They are connected to us in the Holy Spirit.

Saints on this earth already can know and hear others who are physically separated from them; they can see their souls, know their hearts. Why? For the same reason. They know in the Holy Spirit in whom they live because of their close communion with Him. There is no temporal or physical barrier.

This is the universal experience of the life of the Church on earth from the the beginning to this day; one needs only to read the life of saints past or present, even living ones. Better yet, have the privilege to meet one of them.

So much more, beyond compare, are the Saints in heaven. They know us and hear us in the Holy Spirit. They live entirely in the Holy Spirit now, to begin with. They intercede for us, speak to us, and help us.

My own patron saint has appeared to more than one person that I personally know. And he is alive and continues to work on my behalf and on behalf of those who ask for his help. This is the universal doctrine and practice of the Church, East and West, since the first century.

In this way, the supplicatory prayer of the Small Compline says,

“O undefiled, untainted, uncorrupted, most pure, chaste Virgin, Thou Bride of God and Sovereign Lady, who didst unite the Word of God to mankind through thy most glorious birth giving, and hast linked the apostate nature of our race with the heavenly; who art the only hope of the hopeless, and the helper of the struggling, the ever-ready protection of them that hasten unto thee, and the refuge of all Christians . . . as the Mother of God Who loveth mankind, show thy love for mankind and mercifully have compassion upon me a sinner and prodigal, and accept my supplication . . . at the time of my departure taking care of my miserable soul, and driving far away from it the dark countenances of the evil demons . . .

O my Sovereign Lady, most holy Theotokos, in virtue of thine intercession and protection, through the grace and love to mankind of thine only begotten Son, our Lord and God and Savior, Jesus Christ, to Whom is due all glory, honor and worship, together with His unoriginate Father, and His Most Holy and good and life creating Spirit, now and ever, and unto ages of ages. Amen.”

This is why we affirm, in every single Divine Liturgy (of St John Chrysostom) celebrated since at least the fourth century (hardly a modern concept!):

It is truly meet to bless you, Theotokos, ever blessed and most pure, the Mother of our God. More honorable than the Cherubim, more glorious beyond compare than the Seraphim, without corruption you gave birth to God the Word. True Theotokos, we magnify you!

 

Hope this helps. Here’s a short list of books on Church history, and a few others with overviews on the Church’s history and theology, from which you can read the relevant sections:

http://www.amazon.com/Early-Church-Penguin-History-v/dp/0140231994

http://www.amazon.com/Early-Christian-Doctrines-J-Kelly/dp/006064334X/ref=pd_sim_b_6/182-9643628-1295620

http://www.amazon.com/Christian-Tradition-Development-Doctrine-Emergence/dp/0226653714/ref=pd_sim_b_9

http://www.amazon.com/Christian-Tradition-Development-Doctrine-Christendom/dp/0226653730/ref=pd_sim_b_3

http://www.amazon.com/Orthodox-Veneration-Mary-Birthgiver-God/dp/0938635689/ref=la_B00J3EPDEC_1_2?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1409682355&sr=1-2

http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/0103322.htm

http://www.amazon.com/The-Life-Virgin-Maximus-Confessor/dp/0300175043/ref=pd_rhf_se_s_cp_8_YC9X?ie=UTF8&refRID=13KR5MKEV38T8312DSTB

http://www.amazon.com/Mary-Mother-God-Sermons-Gregory/dp/0977498301/ref=la_B001JS17R2_1_4?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1409687930&sr=1-4

http://www.amazon.com/Celebration-Faith-vol-III-Virgin/dp/0881411418/ref=sr_1_7?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1409687972&sr=1-7

 

Notes on Thomistic Concepts on the Structure of Reality

St. Thomas Aquinas from  by Carlo CrivelliThis is a summary of some key concepts for the understanding of the Thomistic theological constructs for the structure of reality and being.

Substance

In Aristotle, there are two senses of substance: the “first substance” is a whole, concrete entity – this horse, this man. The second sense, or “second substance” refers to quiddity – horse, man.

First substance refers to a being or an entity subsisting or existing in itself, not in another being like an accident. This is a metaphysical category; e.g., God, angels, human beings.—not physical, chemical substance. It is the basic ontological unit, a complete, individual whole, a determinate, particular subject of existing and acting, e.g., this tree, this human being, Tom, Mary, etc. It is the proper subject of existence, “that which exists [quod est],” not “that by which something exists [quo est]”

This is the first “category” of Aristotle’s ten categories or predicaments, the principal and primary sense of being. (See the list below)

Aquinas defines “person” as “individual substance of rational nature,” (cf. Boethius) and divine persons as “subsisting relations.”

Second substance refers to the essence/quiddity/nature (including both substantial form and prime matter) that defines the kind of being something is, “that by which” a thing remains the kind of being it is; it is universal, not particular like first substances, and is realized only in first substances. Iit is an internal principle of being (not a being), “that by which”; e.g., humanity, dogness, treeness, not a human being, a dog, a tree—entities are not all externally determined but have certain natures intrinsic to themselves that make them what they are and make them act as what they are; intrinsic or internal principle of being and acting.

Therefore it refers to a set of the defining potentialities proper to a specific kind of being to be actualized by accidents; it provides identity, continuity, and stability in the midst of “accidental changes,” coming to an end when “substantial change” occurs and the entity ceases to be what it is – for example when a body ceases to be human by dying and being decomposed in to chemical substances.

Accidents

They refer to realities that cannot exist in themselves, like first substances, but only in something else that does exist in itself – like color, weight, action, passion, etc. Iit is that by which a being can change while remaining the specifically and individually same entity and provides the elements of change and difference; it is the principle of diversity within the unity of the first substance. Some accidents are called “proper” accidents because they are proper to the species as a whole (e.g., ability to speak, laugh)

There are, according to Aristotle and Aquinas, nine categories of accidents, or modes of being in which a first substance can exist

  1. Quality: good, bad, wise, white
  2. Quantity: two feet long
  3. Action: run, walk, etc.
  4. Passion: being burned, being cut
  5. Relation: double, half, greater than
  6. Place: in the classroom, in Claremont, etc.
  7. Time: yesterday, last year, etc.
  8. Posture: reclining at table, sitting down, etc.
  9. State: having shoes on, being in armor

 

Structure or Essence of Material Substances:

The essence of material substances is composed of substantial form and prime matter. Substantial form is the source of the specific identity or identity as a species, as a human being, as a dog, etc. Prime matter is pure potentiality to be specified, determined, activated by the form. It is the principle of individuation: it multiplies the form and accounts for diversity within the unity of the form or species by receiving and restricting the form to “this” material subject–the possibilities of the species are not exhausted by an individual. For example, “humanity”is  multiplied into “many human individuals” by matter.

Consequently, in human beings there is a composite of form and matter: hylomorphism. There is a unity and distinction of soul and body –  soul as form of the body (matter); the soul is the efficient, transcendent cause of the body through intellect and will

 

Ultimate Principles of Being: Essence and Existence

For any being, or substance there are two fundamental questions: what something is and whether it exists—essence and existence

As such, there is a distinction between ens (a being), esse (to be, act of being, act of existing, activity of existing, existence, as verbal noun), and essence– the act of existing diversified by a diversity of essences. For example, one can ask whether a unicorn actually exists.

There is real distinction between essence and act of existing in all finite beings – they may or may not exist – but only a rational distinction in God, since God’s essence does not possess existence, but rather, is identical with his existence.

 

Ontological primacy of esse, existence:

Thomism is a metaphysics of existence, not metaphysics of first substance–esse is not to be reduced to substance. It is an existentialist, not essentialist ontology. The general rule is that the actual determines the potential (e.g., accidents determine substance; form determines matter (specifying and actualizing).

The act of being cannot be determined by anything outside itself, i.e., by something not existing. It can only be determined internally from within – the finite act of being is not absolute, pure, unique esse but only an act of being of a certain limited kind.

This limitation can only come from essence, which as potency, potentiality of certain kind of being, receives, determines, specifies, and limits the act of being. Thus, the act of existing both actualizes the essence as something other than itself and is limited by essence.

This is different – even opposite than previous ideas found in Alfarabi, Avicenna, Algazali, which, in making a distinction between essence and existence, considered existence as added to essence, i.e., existence as accident, which is then an essentialist philosophy (not existentialist).

In contrast, for Aquinas, existence is not on same level as essence. Existence is not another accident, but the most intimate and most profound element in all things. Existence as accident cannot explain  the necessary existence or simplicity of existence in God. Esse and essence belong to two different orders altogether: esse transcends the whole plane of essence.

Essence is distinct from existence and essence does not contain existence but is also thoroughly actuated by existence. Existence is internal to essence in the sense that essence is truly essence only when actualized by existence, but essence is external to existence in the sense that existence is not inherent in essence; that is to say, a thing can be or not, exist or not; to be a particular kind of being is not necessarily to exist as that kind of being—existence is most internal to me yet external to my essence as this individual of a particular kind.

To create is precisely to produce the esse of things – it is to make things exist. The creator is most intimately present to things because he is present to their act of existing—more deeply than to their materiality or even their spirituality. God is more intimately present to me than I am to myself – as Augustine said, intimius intimo meo.

Existence is graced, intrinsic to me as most intimate to me yet not constitutive of me because I am not my own existence—my existence is always borrowed, gifted, given. Existence is not part of my essence. This distinction precludes pantheism, and yet it does involve a certain panentheism: all things are in God, in the sustaining power of God’s creative causality.

All things have meaning only in relation to existence; what is most perfect is the act of existing, related to all things as to their first act. Existence is the actuality of all things, including essence, form, matter, etc. It precedes all other perfections: the good, the beautiful, one, etc.; these latter are meaningful only insofar as they are or exist and therefore only as particular modes of being or existing. There is a primacy of existence in Aquinas vs. the primacy of the Good in Plato.

 

Cognitive primacy of existence:

Esse, existence, is the horizon of all cognition: all things are understood as existing or at least as capable of existing (the first principle) and we perceive all things under the horizon of being (sub ratione entis). The natural tendency of reason is to essentialize existence, turn it into a mode or kind of essence, especially material essence—to reify esse into a frozen essence, to reduce existence to an abstract concept.

We must distinguish between simple apprehension of essence or quiddity (first operation of the intellect, i.e., what is this? It is a horse, or a unicorn.) and the act of judgment which composes or combines or separates essence and existence (second operation of the intellect which regards the esse of things – the unicorn does not exist, the horse exists). Thus, there is a judgment of existence: “Socrates is”– a composition of substance Socrates and its existence in the unqualified or absolute sense.

It depends also on what the meaning of “is” is!

Judgment of existence in the qualified sense would be: “Socrates is a human being” – the role of the copula: essence of Socrates is to be a man, or white–existential value is not direct in the copula, but still there–actuality of the act of existing is the principal signification of “is,” but secondarily all actuality whatsoever including the actuality of a certain form (man, white).

The copula still designates composition of form and existence; the actuality of the form is consignified —“Socrates exists with such and such determinations” still specifies his particular mode of existing. The unity of subject and predicate is affirmed as existing in reality, outside the mind, irreducible to our own affirming subjectivity. Thus the modern turn to the subject has its limitations.

Every time we make such judgments – Socrates is … – we are already affirming existence, and act of existing as grasped in the act of judging contains a permanent reference to an infinitely rich reality of the pure act of existing–pursuing it all the way to the supreme existent, God. As concept, being is most universal and most abstract—richest in extension but poorest in comprehension. Reason dislikes the undefinable, which being is in its inexhaustible reality.

 

Real distinction between essence and existence in finite beings

Essence can be understood without knowledge of its existence. There is a radical contingency of all beings (they may or not come into existence, and they may nor not cease to exist) and there is the impossibility of there being more than one being in which essence and existence are identical (God).

Existence and essence are related as act and potency. There is no potency in God, who is pure actuality because his essence is identical with his existence.

God is not a genus, a quiddity. Finite existence is existence by participation; God exists by essence – ipsum esse subsistens, the very act of existing that subsists, the subsisting act of existing

Kant says that existence is a logical, not a real predicate, but this is not true; existence is neither merely logical nor merely one among other predicates, but the predicate that confers reality on all other predicates because existence makes all predicates real. The reality of predicates depends on existence.

Thus, Thomist theology is a theology of being (sapiential, contemplative), as opposed to contemporary theologies of life, existence, praxis, liberation, hope, etc. (prophetic, practical).

Kierkegaard speaks of forgetfulness of existence in the subjective sense, Heidegger of forgetfulness of being—Aquinas speaks of the forgetfulness of existence in the metaphysical sense—the sense of the suppression of contingency of existence, death, old age—our tendency to reduce reality to the sensible in their particularity—and ignore the act of existing as the most profound and intimate act of a being as a being (shich requires contemplative detachment from the lures and illusions of sensible things)

Because of the composition of act and potency, where every act is the actualization of an existing potentiality, the world is not a mere succession of purely contingent appearances or acts but an orderly succession of intelligible, stable events—there is no act which is just act without actualizing a potentiality, while potentiality, if it is real, is an already actualized potentiality.

 

 

Hegel’s Realization of the Spirit in History

Friedrich-Hegel-2Hegel is the first thinker to treat history as a matter of philosophical and theological study. He made a distinction between individual existence and social existence, so that history refers primarily to our social life, not individual, private lives. The spirit moves the individual, but history is primarily society in its temporal process – and Hegel’s basic social unity is the nation/state.

The spirit works through history in bringing together freedom and necessity, subjectivity and objectivity. There is a rational pattern that can be discerned in history, as the spirit continues to move forward toward freedom. The progression is necessary, because development is necessary in all levels. In nature, organic matter develops, as a seed becomes a tree; in human beings, children develop, and by necessity a three year old child cannot think and behave like a thirty year old adult.

In the same manner, the spirit develops through the thoughts and actions of nations and civilizations. The spirit actualizes itself in the self-consciousness of human beings and in their progressive consciousness of freedom. For Hegel, it is a discernible pattern of history that the more ancient civilizations had a more limited concept of freedom, whereas democracy only appears in modern times. He argues that in ancient Oriental civilizations, the general pattern was that only the ruler was free, whereas in the later Greek civilization there was an oligarchy of the few who were free – and finally modern nations have the awareness that all should be free. There were exceptions to the rule, and breaks in the general chronology, but the exceptions only prove the rule.

History is not a mere succession of sheer contingencies – not just one random thing after another. For Hegel, if one looks at the world rationally, the world will look rationally back. There is a development of reason in the pattern, since for Hegel reason is substance and infinite power, the infinite material of all natural and spiritual life and the infinite form which activates this material content.[i]

General Design

The sole aim of the philosophical enquiry then is to eliminate the contingent, and so in history we must look for a general design. World history is governed by an ultimate design; it is a rational process of the divine and absolute reason, the manifestation of the one original reason, and a reflection of the archetype in a particular element in the life of the nations. Reason is self-sufficient and contains its end within itself, bringing itself into existence and carrying itself into effect.

The history of the world is thus a rational process, the rational and necessary evolution of the world spirit. A divine will rules supreme and is strong enough to determine the overall content, as events are moved by the moving of the spirit within them, the “true Mercury, the leader of the nations.”[ii]

Modes of Historical Thinking and Writing

As Hegel observes and explains the patterns of the development of world history, he makes distinctions concerning what kind of historical writing is appropriate for his project. He discerns three modes of historical writing: original history, reflexive history and philosophical history.

The first mode, historical writing, is one in which the author is immersed in the spirit of the events he describes, and does not rise above it to reflect upon it. The writer is an eyewitness of the events, and although perspective is time fresh it is also limited by a lack of wider perspective.

The second mode, reflexive history, depicts not only what was present and alive in this or that age, but that which is present in spirit, and so it looks at the past as a whole. This includes surveys of history (compilations), pragmatic history (focus on significance and moral instructions[iii]), critical history (history of history, higher criticism[iv]) and specialized history (which is fragmentary, particular, and abstract: e.g. the history of art).

The third mode of philosophical history (the one Hegel proposes to adopt) focuses on the concrete and “absolutely present,” the “spirit which is eternally present to itself and for which there is no past.” It is the Idea, the leader of nations and of the world, the spirit with its “rational and necessary will” which directs the events of world history.[v] This mode brings a synthesis of reason, spirit, providence, subjectivity, objectivity, movement, and teleology.

The Realization of the Spirit in History

Philosophical history then discerns the patterns of the spirit, which combines reason and will. This is expressed not only in individuals, but also in higher levels of human existence.

There are for Hegel three basic levels of the activity of the spirit:

1. First, the spirit becomes conscious and seeks freedom in the individual spirit.

2. It also moves individuals together as it sublates contradictions and seeks freedom in the level of the nation – the nation spirit.

3. Thirdly, the spirit will also move not only through individuals and nations, but also in guiding the totality of world history – the world spirit.

From a different perspective, these three levels can also be understood in a descending scale: The absolute spirit is incarnated, embodied in the world spirit; the world spirit is incarnated, embodied and particularized in the nation spirit, and the nation spirit is incarnated and embodied in the individual spirit.

The absolute spirit is the ultimate agent and ultimate goal. It is absolute in that it is not determined – but it seeks determination in its embodiment in the world, so that it can eventually sublate contradictions towards ultimate freedom.

In this way, world history belongs to the realm of the spirit. Physical nature does plays a part, but the spirit and the course of its development (actualized in human beings, and, more importantly, in nations) are the true substance of history. After the creation of nature, man appears as the antithesis of nature since the kingdom of God is the spiritual kingdom which is realized in man and which man is expected to translate into actuality – man is active withinthe spirit, and the spirit is active within man. Human nature is a combination of spirit and nature, and essence of the spirit is self-consciousness. [vi]

Deutschland über alles!

hegelHegel, however, is primarily concerned with the spirit of the nation, which for him is the basic unit of world history, not the individual person. Thus he takes a thoroughly socio-historical approach to his philosophy of history, opposing atomistic individualism. Hegel recognizes that it is from the state that and individual derives the substance of his life.

This approach is markedly different from the modern philosophical approaches which, since Descartes, generally concentrate on the individual and his relation to the external reality. Hegel’s philosophy does not allow for any identity outside of relationships embodied in concrete reality, and therefore it is natural that, while recognizing that the movement of the spirit is indeed realized in the individual, there is no meaningful individual who does not derive his existence and meaning from historical relations.

There is no independent individual, for (as we will see later) each element of finite reality is thoroughly dependent upon its finite counterparts, just as finite reality is thoroughly dependent on the infinite and vice-versa.

As an individual, I derive my food, my protection, my value system, and so on, from the social relationships in which I live, move, and have my being. Therefore the spirit of the nation is the womb in which individuals live, and is the basic vehicle of the spirit in its progression toward self-knowledge and freedom.

Hegel’s conception of the state is therefore spiritual, not materialistic, and the “spirit of the nation” is constituted by the ideals that bind people together. All spheres of our lives – politics, technology, religion, art, philosophy, etc. – are expressions of the spirit of the nation.

This is an organic conception of society, in which there is what Hegel calls a principle of coherence between laws, politics, religion, culture, and so on, because the spirit of the nation in its own locus of development toward freedom will affect all these areas in a reasonably uniform way. For example, a nation that has an authoritarian religion will find it hard to have a democratic constitution.

Just as an individual life has to cohere in its different aspects, embracing its negations and sublating them, so also with the state. Internal conflicts bring revolutions and the dialectical approach demands reconciliation of the many realms of life present in the state, since the spirit of the nation articulates itself in this diversity of spheres. They have to cohere, and they generally do – again, the state cannot impose a constitution on a people, since it has to come from the spirit of the people. There must be as much unification of differences in society as possible (and this does not mean sheer uniformity), and some kind of totality is essential even for the sake of difference.

Hegel took the German nation and society to be the pinnacle of the development of the spirit. However, to apply his insights to our current history, it could be said that this becomes especially relevant in our present context, since globalization clearly requires a harmonizing element between the different cultures, religions, ideologies, societies, economic systems, and so on, which have been brought face to face more than ever in the history of mankind.

Civilizations are becoming more and more amalgamated, as now the “wholly other” is my next door neighbor; the challenges of reconciliation and the questions concerning the possibility of unity that maintains diversity brings Hegel’s idea of negation-transcendence-preservation to great relevance today.

Freedom: the part Marx tweaked.

The nation spirit, then, continues to move into greater awareness of freedom. The ultimate phase of national consciousness is the recognition that man is free. This consciousness encompasses and guides all the aims and interests of the nation, and it is on this consciousness that the nation’s rights, customs, and religion depend.

This progression is achieved through a dialectical movement where contradictions are constantly being encountered and sublated; as we have seen, the world is a struggle of classes, religions, ideas, systems, cultures, etc., and thus,

The ultimate aim of the spirit is to know itself, and to comprehend itself no merely intuitively, but also in terms of thought. It must and will succeed in its task; but this very success is also its downfall, and this in turn heralds the emergence of a new phase and a new spirit.[vii]

There is progression, growth and succession, and the task of philosophical world history is to discover the continuity within this movement. It is important to emphasize that the movement of the spirit (particularly the nation spirit throughout history) is not a cycle, but a progression. Every instance in which ideas and practices within a particular society have come into tension and conflict, and then have been resolved and sublated in any way, there is fulfillment.

hegelmugBut as Hegel points out, when the ideals, aspirations, and goals of a nation have received some relief though some resolution of conflict, the tendency (as with individual human beings) is that stagnation and “boredom” occurs. Once (literal or metaphorical) battles have been fought, human beings and nations tend to become complacent, and often lose their sense of greater purpose. For Hegel, this eventually issues in a kind of “death” of the nation, and what is needed is a sort of resurgence from the ashes.

The universal spirit does not die; it dies only in its capacity as national spirit. But the universal spirit will continue to move, and even this death will not be final.

As a phoenix, the spirit rises out of the death of change and comes again to life. The spirit rises again not just as a mere repetition of what it was before, but rather now enhanced and transfigured in a new stage of development.

The Spirit Carries On.

[i] Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, 27-28

[ii] Ibid., 29

[iii] Hegel argues that history teaches that we have never learned anything from history, because each age and each nation finds itself in peculiar circumstances and situations.

[iv] For Hegel, higher criticism “has been the pretext for introducing all the un-historical monstrosities a vain imagination could suggest … a method of bringing a [present into the past, namely by substituting subjective fancies which are considered the more excellent the bolder they are … (22-23)

[v] Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, 24

[vi] Ibid., 44

[vii] Ibid., 56

The Meditations of Descartes – A Clear and Distinct (albeit brief) Summary

DescartesIn the first meditation, Descartes calls everything into doubt that can be reasonably doubted. Descartes’ goal is not a wholesale denial of reality, but rather a careful attempt to re-examine presuppositions in order to assess whether they are justified.

His overall project is to find whatever causes of error there might be, so a methodology for the elimination of error might be developed; and, in the process, one can demonstrate the existence of our souls and of God.

He begins by dismantling the foundations and assumptions of knowledge to the most basic level, to start from scratch:

And thus I realized that once in my life I had to raze everything to the ground and begin again from the original foundations.

He calls his senses into question, and assumes the possibility that all he perceives now might be a mere dream.

Let us assume, then, for the sake of argument, that we are dreaming and that such particulars as these are not true: that we are opening our eyes, moving our head, and extending our hands. Perhaps we do not even have such hands, or any such body at all.

As to the laws of logic and arithmetic, they might as well be products of an evil god or demon who wants to deceive him. If God is good, he would not deceive his creatures, he ponders. But he recognizes that he occasionally makes mistakes, and so it might be possible that God is not so good or incapable of deceiving.

Divider

In the second meditation, Descartes realizes that he can only doubt or be deceived if he exists. He concludes that the only thing that he cannot conceptually separate from his existence is his own thinking. Therefore, he is at least a thinking thing.

He investigates his perception of wax: it has a certain color, shape, etc. But if he brings it close to the fire, it loses those properties; but he still understands it as wax. Descartes concludes that the wax could take more shapes than he could imagine and still be wax to him, which shows that he grasps the wax not with his senses or with his imagination, but with his mind alone. Once again, the fact that he grasps with the mind demonstrates minimally that he exists, that he is a thinking thing:

But what then am I? A thing that thinks. What is that? A thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wills, refuses, and that also imagines and senses

Divider

In meditation three he argues that everything he sees clearly and distinctly is true, since he sees that he is a thinking thing in that way. Logic, arithmetic and geometry are within that realm. The only basis for doubting them is the postulation that there might be a god who is deceiving him. So the question becomes, is there a god, and if so, is he a deceiver?

Ideas differ from one another in their objective existence, in that ideas of a substance have more objective reality than ideas about non-substances. Therefore, the idea of the greatest substance (God) has the greatest objective reality.

Hence, things exist in the intellect objectively and they are plainly not nothing. Therefore, the causes of such ideas have to have formal modes of being.

There are three classes of ideas:

(i) God;

(ii) corporeal and inanimate things;

(iii) angels, animals and other things.

Ideas of (iii) could perhaps come from other ideas of God and himself. (ii) could also come from him (as related to substance, duration, number, etc.) But the idea of God is the idea of infinity and perfection, and so could not have come from finite and imperfect Descartes.

Therefore, his idea of God, with the greatest objective reality, must derive from a real cause, a real God who exists, And this God has such a nature that it is impossible for Him to deceive.

I understand by the name “God” a certain substance that is infinite, independent, supremely intelligent, and supremely powerful, and that created me along with everything else that exists . . . Indeed all these are such that, the more carefully I focus my attention on them the less possible it seems they could have arisen from myself alone. Thus, from what has been said, I must conclude that God necessarily exists . . . From these considerations it is quite obvious that he cannot be a deceiver, for it is manifest by the light of nature that all fraud and deception depend on some defect.

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In meditation four, the idea of God is the most clear and distinct he has, and that He cannot be a deceiver. In his goodness, He has given Descartes faculties that, when used properly, cannot make mistakes, But he (Descartes) does make mistakes, and that is the problem. Descartes acknowledges that his intellect is not complete. God has created him with free will – complete because it has been given according to the image of God.

It is only the will of free choice that I experience to be so great in me that I cannot grasp the idea of any greater faculty

Genuine free will cannot be given partially. It is the simultaneous work of his intellect and his free will, when the latter outstrips the boundaries of the former, that allows for error; that is to say, the problem is not with cognitive capacities in themselves, but with the will. However, since the will causes the intellect to go astray, without clear and distinct understanding, one should withhold judgment.

What then is the source of my errors? They are owing simply to the fact that, since the will extends further than the intellect, I do not contain the will within the same boundaries; rather, I also extend it to things I do not understand. Because the will is indifferent in regard to such matters, it easily turns away from the true and the good; and in this way I am deceived and I sin . . . For as often as I restrain my will when I make judgements, so that it extends only to those matters that the intellect clearly and distinctly discloses to it, it plainly cannot happen that I err.

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Meditation five shows that he has the idea of God in a no less clear and distinct way than the ideas of mathematics. The existence of God has to have, then, the same degree of certainty as mathematical truths. Existence is conceptually inseparable from the concepts of God, which presumably shows that God must indeed exist. He knows God exists based on his clear and distinct idea, and, since God is the one who gives infallibility to the “clear and distinct,” such concept allows him to achieve full and certain knowledge of countless things (which seems circular):

Even if I were dreaming, if anything is evident to my intellect, then it is entirely true . . . now it is possible for me to achieve full and certain knowledge about countless things, both about God and intellectual matters, as well as about the entirety of that corporeal nature which is the object of pure mathematics.

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Meditation six allows for the rest of the universe to come flooding back in. Since he exists, and God also exists and is not a deceiver, his ideas of everything else are not fabricated by God, and must therefore be caused by the corporeal things. His senses are not infallible, but he can correct them by what he clearly and distinctly perceives.

Descartes argues for the commingling of the body and mind, where mind is simple, indivisible, and the body is complex and divisible, being therefore distinct. This becomes the basis for Cartesian dualism:

There is a great difference between a mind and a body, in that a body, by its very nature, is always divisible. On the other hand, the mind is utterly indivisible … this consideration alone would suffice to teach me that the mind is wholly diverse from the body.

According to Descartes, the body and the mind communicate through the pinary gland in the brain. The sensations that come from different parts of the complex body might admit error as they reach that part of the brain, but memory and intellect are able to keep them in check.

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Assessment

In the first meditation, Descartes seems to be bound by his own doubts. He states that he will doubt everything that can be reasonably doubted, and goes as far as to say that he might be mistaken every time he adds two and three, or counts the sides of a square.

If indeed there might be an evil God who will cause Descartes to be mistaken in “arithmetic, geometry, and such other disciplines” (presumably logic), even if they seem to be certain and indubitable, how can he reasonably doubt everything? Descartes has to choose whether reason can be relied upon in any sense, before he can reasonably doubt reason.

Furthermore, the entire foundationalist structure for Descartes’ epistemology is one belief: “I think.” This seems a rather thin foundation. Can this classical foundationalism yield enough justification from one belief to a multitude in the structure?

Therefore, it seems that his project is destined to failure from the start. He could doubt, but he does not seem to realize that he could also doubt his doubt. This will also be overlooked later as Descartes relies on the infallibility of what is “clearly and distinctly perceived.” The result is that what became more or less the birth of Rationalism in the West had intrinsic problems from the start.

Descartes’ desire to construe a foundation for epistemology based solely on autonomous human reason was not revolutionary, but a natural product of the incipient modernism of his time. His influence spanned through centuries, and it was not until relatively recently that epistemology began to doubt its own capacity to achieve Cartesian certainty if the proper procedure was meticulously followed.

Up until the time of the beginnings of modernism, thinking in the West followed an epistemology of analogy, where God and the world were known in the proportion that finite human beings could know: truly, and yet finitely, recognizing that created reality was a participation in existence given by God. Now, the mode of knowledge was switching to an univocal approach; later, postmodernism would turn to an equivocal epistemology.

Of course, both during his time, as well as later, some had already pointed some logical flaws on Descartes’ arguments. However, his project opened up avenues for the more systematic separation between revealed dogma and pure reason – which was taken up by Kant.

From that time, philosophy could become in principle a separate realm from theology, and epistemology relied on the primacy of reason and intuition over sensation and experience, regarding all or most ideas as innate; as a result, there was an emphasis on certain knowledge (rather than merely probable) as the goal of inquiry. There was great optimism in regards to the future of mankind, physical sciences were beginning to take great leaps, and the expectation gained ascendancy that certain knowledge not only could but should be achieved free from any constraints of ecclesiastical authority.

Naturally, this also found expression in the reverse direction, in the very realm of religion – particularly in the work of the Reformers, who had a much more modest place for traditional authority than Rome, and so examined Scriptures through reason and, presumably, the illumination of the Spirit.

But of course, ultimate reality was revealed by sola scriptura, and the Scriptures meant not necessarily what the Church had passed through Tradition, but, in good humanistic fashion, what the appropriate methods of interpretation, with the correct linguistic training and tools, would yield. Cogito, ergo interpreto.

As history progressed, eventually the unifying center of reality for the Enlightenment and modernity was autonomous human reason; both broke with the medieval assumptions about authority and epistemology, even though in different ways, but both also substituted their own paradigms as their epistemological authorities.

It was not until recent times that Postmodernism sprung up as the pendulum began to swing the other way. However, as I have pointed in another article, Postmodernism, while bringing much needed correction to modernist assumptions, could not escape retaining its individualistic bent.